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Experienced meditators typically report that they experience time slowing down in
meditation practice as well as in everyday life. Conceptually this phenomenon may be
understood through functional states of mindfulness, i.e., by attention regulation, body
awareness, emotion regulation, and enhanced memory. However, hardly any systematic
empirical work exists regarding the experience of time in meditators. In the current
cross-sectional study, we investigated whether 42 experienced mindfulness meditation
practitioners (with on average 10 years of experience) showed differences in the experience
of time as compared to 42 controls without any meditation experience matched for age,
sex, and education.The perception of time was assessed with a battery of psychophysical
tasks assessing the accuracy of prospective time judgments in duration discrimination,
duration reproduction, and time estimation in the milliseconds to minutes range as well
with several psychometric instruments related to subjective time such as the ZimbardoTime
Perspective Inventory, the Barratt Impulsivity Scale and the FreiburgMindfulness Inventory.
In addition, subjective time judgments on the current passage of time and retrospective
time ranges were assessed. While subjective judgements of time were found to be
signiﬁcantly different between the two groups on several scales, no differences in
duration estimates in the psychophysical tasks were detected. Regarding subjective time,
mindfulness meditators experienced less time pressure, more time dilation, and a general
slower passage of time. Moreover, they felt that the last week and the last month passed
more slowly. Overall, although no intergroup differences in psychophysical tasks were
detected, the reported ﬁndings demonstrate a close association between mindfulness
meditation and the subjective feeling of the passage of time captured by psychometric
instruments.
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INTRODUCTION
One aspect that is noticed by individuals during mindfulness-
oriented meditation and thereafter in daily life is that they
frequently experience subjective time slowing down considerably
and the present moment feels expanded (Kabat-Zinn, 2005). Con-
ceptually, the ability of expert mindfulness meditators to focus
more strongly on momentary sensory experiences and to be
increasingly aware of one’s own feelings and body states leads to a
slowing down of time and an expansion of the experienced present
moment (Wittmann and Schmidt, 2014). According to a recent
conceptualization, self- and bodily processes lie at the core of
human time perception, and intertwined affective and interocep-
tive states create our experience of time (Craig, 2009; Droit-Volet
et al., 2013; Wittmann, 2013; Pollatos et al., 2014a,b). These func-
tional aspects are also affected by states of mindfulnessmeditation,
namely through self-awareness and self-regulation encompassing
bodily awareness and emotion regulation (Hölzel et al., 2011;Vago
and Silbersweig, 2012; Kerr et al., 2013; Esch, 2014). An increased
attentional capacity to focus on the present moment in mindful-
ness meditators (Jha et al., 2007; Zeidan et al., 2010; Moore et al.,
2012) thereafter might inﬂuence time judgments of momentarily
experienced temporal intervals (prospective time estimation). In
addition, retrospective estimation of duration might be affected
through an increased awareness of events at the present moment
which in turn leads to enhanced build-up of episodic memory
load (Wittmann and Schmidt, 2014). For the distinction of cog-
nitive models concerning prospective and retrospective duration
judgment, see the overview by Zakay and Block (1997). In essence,
in this family of models, prospective time is explained accord-
ing to a pacemaker–accumulator where a pacemaker produces a
series of ‘pulses,’ analogous to the ticks of a clock. The number of
pulses recorded during an interval represents experienced dura-
tion. However, only when attention is actually directed to time an
attentional gate opens and allows the pulses to accumulate. The
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more attention is paid to the passage of time the longer dura-
tion is experienced (Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007). In retrospective
time perception duration is reconstructed from memory. That
is, the more contextual changes are perceived during a certain
time span, which are stored in memory and later retrieved, the
longer the duration is subjectively experienced in retrospect (Block
and Zakay, 1997; Avni-Babad and Ritov, 2003). However useful
these cognitive models of subjective time may be, regarding neural
underpinnings of time perception no consensus exists, many dif-
ferent functional and neurophysiological models exist (Wittmann
and van Wassenhove, 2009; Hancock and Block, 2012; Merchant
et al., 2013; Wittmann, 2013).
The study of individuals in altered states of consciousness or
with specially trained capacities such as in expert meditators offers
a way to explore the psychological and neural mechanisms under-
lying both time perception and consciousness. In altered states
of consciousness such as in meditative states, under the inﬂu-
ence of drugs or in many psychiatric and neurological conditions,
the sense of the self is modulated together with the time sense
(for an earlier overview, see Block, 1979). In vivid day dream-
ing or in hypnoses where individuals imagine scenes and are
not focused on themselves duration is typically underestimated
(Naish, 2007). On the other hand, individuals during mindful-
ness meditation as well as in everyday life state that subjective
time slows down and felt duration expands (Kabat-Zinn, 2005).
Only few studies to date exist however which have attempted to
empirically disclose the relationship between mindfulness and the
perception of time. In one study assessing the duration of the
present moment as operationalized with the perceptual switching
of the Necker cube, a visual ambiguous ﬁgure, 38 practitioners
of mindfulness showed longer duration of subjective ‘nowness’
as compared to 38 control subjects with no meditation experi-
ence in the instruction condition to hold a given percept as long
as possible (Sauer et al., 2012). That is, the proﬁciency of mind-
fulness was found to be associated with an increased ability to
stabilize an ambiguous percept in a bi-stable image paradigm. It
was concluded that the subjective “now” can be longer for medita-
tors than for non-meditators, and individual levels of mindfulness
may convey this effect. This ﬁnding complements an earlier study
with Buddhist monks who during their lifetime have extensive
meditation practice on a daily basis and were able to voluntarily
prolong themental perception of one out of two alternations in the
binocular rivalry paradigm (Carter et al., 2005). In a study with a
population of unselected students (Wittmann et al., 2014), scoring
higher on the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI;Walach et al.,
2006) and the Comprehensive Inventory of Mindfulness Expe-
rience (CHIME; Bergomi et al., 2013) was found to be related
to a better emotional handling of the past and a more pro-
nounced future perspective. Self-attributed mindfulness levels
were associated with a more accurate timing ability in the mil-
liseconds and multiple seconds range. These ﬁndings suggest a
close association between dispositional or trait mindfulness and
the perception of time.
Only a few studies exist so far which investigated how time per-
ception in the seconds-to-minutes range is altered before and after
meditation experience, thus probing for induced states of mind-
fulness. In one study, subjects with no experience in meditation
took part in a 1-week mindfulness meditation program with one
30-min meditation session per day (Sucala and David, 2013).
At the end of the week, the meditation group relatively over-
estimated thedurationof presented video-clipswhich lasted 5-min
as compared to a group that had not participated in the program.
However, no direct pre- vs. post meditation task was applied
and no group with a control program was tested. A pre- post
design and the comparison with a control task group was under-
taken in a different study, in which subjects with no experience in
meditation were exposed to a pre-recorded meditation session of
10 min duration (Kramer et al., 2013). Using the temporal bisec-
tion task in the time range around 1 s, it was shown that the
meditation group relatively overestimated the duration of stim-
uli post- vs. pre- meditation as well as compared to the control
group, which did not show a difference before vs. after listen-
ing to a story for 10 min. In a recent study using the temporal
bisection task with durations between 4 and 8 s,mindfulness med-
itation experience increased the sensitivity to time and lengthened
subjective duration. This temporal improvement was primar-
ily observed in more experienced meditators as compared to
meditation-naïve individuals (Droit-Volet et al., 2015). Another
study has correlated time perception performance with brain acti-
vation correlates (EEG) and found a decrease of gamma power
in midline structures together with longer duration productions
(Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012). This duration production task in
the seconds’ range actually showed to be sensitive for differences
between meditation techniques when assessing pre- post med-
itation changes in timing performance (Berkovich-Ohana et al.,
2011). Individual highly trained meditators after years of practice
can eventually reach altered states of consciousness during med-
itation where the experiences of time and space together with a
sense of self are lost (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013). However, in
our study we concentrate on possible differences in subjective time
between meditators and non-meditators in every-day experience
and behavior.
So far only a narrow selection of time perception tests has been
employed in cross-sectional or longitudinal studies probing for
differences in trait-mindfulness or after practicing meditation.
Moreover, only prospective time judgments in the seconds-to-
minutes range have been assessed. Here, we present results
from a cross-sectional study, where we systematically investi-
gated whether individuals with extensive mindfulness meditation
training are more precise and accurate in psychophysical time
perception tasks assessing different modalities and different time
ranges in a series of prospective time judgment tasks.We employed
those temporal processing tasks which not only have proven
to reveal inter-individual differences in various subject groups
(Wittmann et al., 2011; Pütz et al., 2012), but in a recent study
also have shown to be sensitive to variations in self-rated mind-
fulness (Wittmann et al., 2014). Moreover, we wanted to use
a selection of classic tasks (duration discrimination, duration
reproduction, duration production, time estimation) covering
a range of durations from the milliseconds to multiple sec-
onds. Subjective time was furthermore assessed with subjective
scales on the felt passage of time and prospective and retro-
spective judgments of longer periods of time, i.e., the day, the
week, years. Moreover, we employed inventories assessing the
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time perspectives of the past, present, and future. In order
to assess an extensive proﬁle of psychological factors, which
has shown to be related to subjective time, we also measured
momentary subjective well-being, general physical activity, and
personality indices such as subjective ratings of mindfulness,
impulsiveness, as well as objective indices of attentional capac-
ities (Wittmann et al., 2014). The latter capacity is included in
this study since attention strongly modulates time perception
(Droit-Volet andMeck, 2007) and attention is affected bymindful-
ness meditation practice (Jha et al., 2007; Wittmann and Schmidt,
2014).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
DESIGN
We performed a cross-sectional study with one measurement
point comparing experienced meditators with matched controls.
The studywas conducted in two laboratories, one in Freiburg,Ger-
many, and one in Munich, Germany, in a multi-center approach
in order to raise the validity of the results. The study was approved
by the Ethics committees of the two Universities.
PARTICIPANTS
42 experienced mindfulness meditation practitioners (at least
3 years of continuous practice; at least 2 h of practice over the last
8 weeks) and 42 age-, sex and education case matched controls,
without any meditation experience, were investigated. Subjects
were recruited by advertisement in meditation centers, on online
platforms of the universities, and by word of mouth. Medita-
tors were included when practicing regularly a form of meditation
which had a dominant orientation toward awareness of the present
moment. Therefore we included individuals if they participated in
forms of mindfulness meditation, Vipassana meditation, or Soto
Zen. Age was restricted to the range between 21 and 50 years in
order to constrain age-related effects in the psychophysical tasks.
Control subjects were supposed to have no experience with any
form of meditation including Yoga or Tai-Chi. The matching
criteria were sex, age (±5 years) and education (±1 level of 5).
Participants who had to be ﬂuent in German were additionally
required to report good health and no known medical, psycho-
logical, neurological or psychiatric problems as assessed with a
detailed screening form. Participants signed an informed con-
sent and received a moderate ﬁnancial compensation (€20) for
participation which lasted ∼2 h.
INSTRUMENTS
Two inventories were employed to control for potential factors that
could inﬂuence and explain performance and subjective ratings
between groups: the German version of the international physi-
cal activity questionnaire (IPAQ; Ainsworth et al., 2000) assesses
the amount of physical activity over the last week; with the
Kurzfragebogen zur aktuellen Beanspruchung (short questionnaire
on current demands, KAB; Müller and Basler, 1993) the awareness
of everyday demands (and resulting stress level) is assessed; this
inventory thus can be used as a proxy measure for the momentary
well-being of an individual. Both physical activity (Sysoeva et al.,
2013) and emotional well-being (Lamotte et al., 2014) have shown
to inﬂuence time judgments.
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory
The 14-item version of the FMI (Walach et al., 2006; Kohls et al.,
2009) measures mindfulness on the basis of a two-dimensional
structure with the factor ‘presence’ as ability to attend to the
present moment (“I am open to the present moment”) and the
factor ‘acceptance’ as non-judgmental attitude (“I am able to smile
when I notice how I sometimes make life difﬁcult”) utilizing a
4-point item scale format.
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11)
The German version (Preuss et al., 2008) of the BIS-11 (Barratt
et al., 1999) consists of 30 4-point items ranging from 1 (rarely) to
4 (almost always). The resulting subscales are planning impulsivity
(“I plan tasks carefully”), motor impulsivity (“I do things without
thinking”), and attention/cognition impulsivity (“I concentrate
easily”).
Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI)
The German version (Brandler and Rammsayer, 2002) of the ZTPI
(Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999) contains 56 5-point items ranging
from 1 (very untrue) to 5 (very true). Five subscales represent
the individual focus on the time perspectives: past-negative (“I
think about the bad things that have happened to me in the past”),
present-hedonistic (“I take risks to put excitement in my life”),
future (“I am able to resist temptations when I know that there is
work to be done”), past-positive (“Happy memories of good times
spring readily to mind”), and present-fatalistic (“My life path is
controlled by forces I cannot inﬂuence”).
Subjective time questionnaire
The ﬁrst part of the subjective time questionnaire (Wittmann
and Lehnhoff, 2005) consists of questions concerning the sub-
jective experience of the passage of time in the present, past, and
future and is assessed with visual analog scales with the two anchor
points: “very slowly” and“very fast.” The ﬁrst question asks: “How
fast does time usually pass for you?” and is potentially related to
an intermediate time range associated with the course of hours
and the present day. The retrospective perspective of longer time
intervals is assessed with four questions asking how fast last week,
last month, last year, and the past 10 years have passed. Four
questions assess the outlook concerning future time intervals of
next week, next month, next year, and the next 10 years. All of
the visual analog scales had a length of 100 mm and answers
were read out at the point (in millimeters) subjects marked on
the horizontal line. The second part of the questionnaire con-
sists of statements concerning subjective judgements of time with
assigned values of 0 = strong rejection to 4 = strong approval
referring to the feeling of time pressure (ﬁve statements, e.g., “I
often think that time is running out”) or to the feeling of time
expansion (ﬁve statements, e.g., “My time is not ﬁlled”). A mean
value was calculated for the ﬁve statements on ‘time pressure’ and
‘time expansion.’
Time estimation and time production
In three different computerized number reading tasks compiled by
a PowerPoint presentation, subjects had to estimate the duration
of the tasks (prospective verbal time estimation), that is, read-
ing aloud numbers presented on the screen with jittered pause
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intervals of 4, 6, or 8 s. In the two estimation tasks subjects
had to estimate the duration of two number reading sessions
of 40 and 80 s. In the production task subjects were requested
to press a button when they felt that 1 min had passed. Essen-
tially, number reading in the three tasks was designed to prevent
subjects from counting. The actual task was to estimate and pro-
duce the durations as accurately as possible. Each of the tasks was
presented once.
Auditory duration discrimination
In the employed computer task (Pütz et al., 2012) subjects had to
indicate which one out of two presented auditory stimuli (white
noise) was longer, the ﬁrst or the second. In the sequence of tri-
als the standard duration was always 1000 ms, the comparison
stimulus was always longer and separated by a pause interval of
500 ms. Standard and comparison stimuli were presented in ran-
dom order. The longer stimulus varied according to the adaptive
maximum-likelihood based algorithm YAAP (Treutwein, 1997),
which determines the next stimulus presentation according to the
subject’s responses. According to this procedure, stimuli in each
trial are set at the current best estimate of the threshold. This
tracking procedure estimates a threshold – representing duration
discrimination accuracy – corresponding to 75% correct discrimi-
nation based on a logistic psychometric function. According to this
procedure the number of trials varies between subjects and can be
taken as measure of precision over the course of given responses.
Visual and auditory duration reproduction – long
In two separate computer tasks running on Psychtoolbox for Mat-
lab subjects had to reproduce the duration of (1) a visual and (2)
an auditory stimulus with intervals of 8, 14, and 20 s duration (six
trials per interval, respectively, presented in randomized order). In
each trial, a green square (a sinus tone of 440 Hz) is ﬁrst presented
for one of the three durations. After the pause of either 4.5, 5, or
5.5 s duration a second yellow square (a sinus tone of 500 Hz)
appeared. It had to be stopped by pressing the space bar when par-
ticipants felt that this second stimulus had reached the duration
of the ﬁrst. Participants were requested not to use mental strate-
gies such as inner counting but to rely on their subjective feeling
of elapsed time. To further prevent mental counting, participants
were additionally given a secondary working-memory task. Before
each trial four numberswere presented. At the end of each trial one
number appeared and the subjects responded whether the num-
ber was one of the four previously presented by pressing the left
or right arrow button, respectively for ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ The accuracy
and precision of duration reproduction can be calculated from
the temporal reproduction performance. In a subset of subjects
we additionally recorded psychophysiological parameters, results
of which will be presented elsewhere.
Visual duration reproduction – short
Similar to the two versions with longer intervals, a visual (but not
auditory) duration reproduction task with stimulus duration of
600, 800, 1000, 1200, and 1400 ms (with eight trials per interval
presented in randomized order) was employed with a green and
yellow square marking the two intervals and with pause intervals
of 1.5, 2.75, 2, 2.25, or 2.5 s in between. No secondary working-
memory task was presented for these short stimuli. Subjects were
requested to stop the second yellow square by pressing the space
bar when subjects felt that it had reached the duration of the ﬁrst
green square.
The attention network test (ANT)
The ANT (Fan et al., 2002) assesses the processing efﬁciency of
the three attention networks of (1) alerting, (2) orienting, and (3)
executive attention. They are quantiﬁed bymeans of computerized
reaction time measures for differently cued and un-cued stimulus
conditions with or without presented ﬂankers. In essence, the
ANT is a combination of a cued reaction time task and a ﬂanker
task, where cues can facilitate reaction time and ﬂankers can either
facilitate or impede reaction time. Participants have to respond
to either the left or right arrow key on the computer keyboard
dependingon the stimulus conﬁguration, the target stimulus being
an arrow pointing to the left or right and ﬂankers being either
congruent (facilitating) or incongruent (impeding). An overall
reaction time score and an index of accuracy are also calculated.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
t-tests for group differences are employed and one-factorial
ANOVAs for group differences with the two factors of ‘group’ and
the different ‘time intervals’ in the duration reproduction tasks.
For multiple comparisons alpha level adjustments according to
the false discovery rate method (FDR; Benjamini and Hochberg,
1995) was applied for each measurement and inventory with ini-
tial signiﬁcance levels set to p < 0.05. When statistically signiﬁcant
group differences are found, we calculated the effect size using
Cohen’s d.
RESULTS
The 42 meditators (17 men) with a mean age of 40.2 years
(SD = 7.6; range = 24–50) had a meditation experience of on
average 10.4 years (SD = 6.9; range: 3–32 years) and had prac-
ticed on average 7.4 h per week (SD = 5.0; range: 2–21 h)
over the last 8 weeks. See Table 1 for all the following per-
formance indices of the two groups and related statistics. No
group differences were detected in the amount of physical activ-
ity over the last week as assessed with the International Physical
Activity Questionnaire [t(82) = −0.128; p = 0.205] and in the
awareness of everyday demands resulting in varying stress levels
assessed with the KAB [t(82) = −0.028; p = 0.978]. Medita-
tors had signiﬁcantly higher values of mindfulness in the FMI
in both subscales of ‘presence’ [t(82) = −5.624; p = 0.0001;
Cohen’s d = −1.23] and ‘acceptance’ [t(82) = −6.614; p = 0.0001;
Cohen’s d = −1.44]. However, they did not differ in any
of the ﬁve variables of the Attention Network Test (ANT; all
p > 0.1). Surprisingly, meditators reported more impulsiveness
in the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale on one subscale [‘BIS motor
impulsivity’: t(82) = −2.960; p = 0.004; signiﬁcant after FDR
adjustment; Cohen’s d = 0.65; see also BIS sum: t(82) = −2.266;
p = 0.026; n.s.; ‘BIS non-planning impulsivity’: t(82) = −2.442;
p = 0.017; n.s.].
In the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI) control
subjects showed signiﬁcantly higher values in the past negative
perspective compared to meditators [t(82) = 2.792; p = 0.007;
Cohen’s d = −0.61]; no other variables of the ZTPI revealed
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Table 1 | Mean group differences between meditators and control subjects in self-rating scales.
Mean (SD)
Variable Mindfulness meditators Control subjects T (df = 82) p
Physical activity questionnaire (IPAQ) 3678 (2635 ) 3015 (2086 ) −1.277 0.205
Awareness of everyday demands (KAB) 13.9 (3.6 ) 13.9 (4.1) −0.028 0.978
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI)
Presence 19.4 (1.9) 16.5 (2.8 ) −5.624 0.0001*
Acceptance 24.9 (3.1) 20.2 (3.5) −6.614 0.0001*
Attention NetworkTest (ANT)
Alerting 33.1 (18.9) 34.5 (23.5 ) 0.286 0.775
Orienting 54.2 (24.1) 51.1 (25.9) −0.566 0.573
Executive attention 116.3 (28.7 ) 125.0 (38.1) 1.192 0.237
Mean Reaction time [ms] 579 (67 ) 601 (59) 1.628 0.107
Mean accuracy [%] 96.6 (7.1) 96.8 (7.2) 0.137 0.891
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS)
Non-planning 26.0 (4.4) 23.6 (4.6 ) −2.442 0.017
Motor 24.9 (4.5 ) 21.9 (4.6 ) −2.960 0.004*
Cognitive 14.6 (3.1) 17.1 (10.4) 1.502 0.137
BIS Sum 65.3 (7.9) 61.2 (8.8 ) −2.266 0.026
ZimbardoTime Perspective Inventory (ZTPI)
Past negative 21.6 (4.8 ) 24.8 (5.7) 2.792 0.007*
Present hedonistic 50.3 (5.7 ) 48.7 (7.4) −1.107 0.272
Future 41.4 (5.7 ) 43.9 (6.8 ) 1.848 0.068
Past positive 29.4 (4.3) 31.3 (4.5 ) 1.928 0.057
Present fatalistic 23.9 (4.6 ) 21.7 (4.2) −2.308 0.024
Subjective time questionnaire [0 . . . 100]
“How fast does time usually pass for you?” 61 (16) 75 (14) 4.117 0.0001*
How fast . . .
. . . last week 64 (18 ) 78 (18) 3.599 0.001*
. . . last month 62 (19) 77 (16) 3.768 0.0001*
. . . last year 65 (19) 72 (21) 1.665 0.1
. . . last 10 years 59 (21) 68 (21) 1.871 0.065
. . . next week 58 (20) 73 (21) 3.492 0.001*
. . . next month 60 (18) 69 (18) 2.338 0.022*
. . . next year 55 (19) 67 (19) 2.821 0.006*
. . . next 10 years 57 (22) 63 (22) 1.254 0.213
Time pressure [0 . . . 4] 2.00 (0.8 ) 2.69 (0.7 ) 4.224 0.001*
Time expansion [0 . . . 4] 0.79 (0.6 ) 0.46 (0.4) −2.843 0.006*
*Signiﬁcant differences with initial alpha level of 0.05 adjusted with the false discovery rate (FDR) for multiple tests marked in bold.
signiﬁcant group differences. In the subjective time questionnaire
assessing the passage of time, several parameters showed sig-
niﬁcant group differences in the way that time was relatively
slowed down in meditators and temporal intervals were rela-
tively expanded: compared to controls, meditators felt less time
pressure [t(82) = 4.224; p = 0.0001; Cohen’s d = −0.92], more
time dilation [t(82) = 2.843; p = 0.006; Cohen’s d = 0.62], and
a generally slower passage of time [t(82) = 4.117; p = 0.0001;
Cohen’s d = −0.9]; moreover, they sensed that the past week
[t(82) = 3.599; p = 0.001; Cohen’s d = −0.79] and the past
month [t(82) = 3.768; p = 0.0001; Cohen’s d = −0.82] were
subjectively longer; but not the last year and the last 10 years.
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Judging prospectively, meditators thought that the next week
[t(82) = 3.492; p = 0.001; Cohen’s d = −0.76], the next month
t(82) = 2.338; p = 0.022; Cohen’s d = 0.51], the next year
[t(82) = 2.822; p = 0.006; Cohen’s d = −0.62; all signiﬁcant after
FDR adjustment], but not the next 10 years, would be passing by
more slowly.
In the psychophysical time perception tasks spanning the
range from milliseconds (auditory duration discrimination, visual
duration reproduction) to several seconds (visual and auditory
duration reproduction), and the minutes range (time estimation
and time production), no group differences for ‘accuracy’ or ‘pre-
cision’ of performance between the mindfulness meditators and
the matched controls were detected (see Table 2 for performance
indices), nor were any interactions of group × intervals in the
temporal reproduction tasks signiﬁcant (t-tests and ANOVAs all
p > 0.1).
DISCUSSION
We compared performance of 42 experienced mindfulness med-
itators and 42 age-, sex-, and education matched controls. On
average, the included meditators were comparatively highly expe-
rienced in mindfulness meditation since they had practiced on
average for 10 years and had practiced regularly for an average of
7 h per week over the last 8 weeks. With respect to time per-
ception indices, the focus of our investigation, the results are
clear-cut: regarding subjective time,mindfulness meditators expe-
rienced less time pressure,more time dilation, and a slower passage
of time. Moreover, in retrospective judgments, they felt that the
last week and the last month had passed more slowly. However,
and importantly, regarding psychophysical tasks in the range of
milliseconds-to-seconds and to minutes, there were no group dif-
ferences regarding accuracy and precision of timing performance.
We will discuss these results below.
Results relating to group differences of the FMI, ZTPI, and
BIS will be considered ﬁrst as they deﬁne the context and under-
standing of the above mentioned results in subjective time. Not
surprisingly, the group of meditators reported to be more mind-
ful with respect to both factors of the FMI of ‘presence’ and
‘acceptance.’ In the ZTPI control subjects loaded higher on the
‘past negative’ subscale, no other time perspective revealed signif-
icant differences. As has been shown before, a non-judgmental
attitude – which is one focus of mindfulness meditation practice –
is related to more emotional control, which again is associated
with more positive attitudes concerning past events – as measured
with the ZTPI (Wittmann et al., 2014). Surprisingly, the medi-
tation group exhibited signiﬁcantly higher values in the subscale
of ‘motor impulsiveness.’ Typically, ‘mindfulness’ and ‘impulsive-
ness’ are negatively correlated. In studies using different self-rating
and behavioral assessment techniques, higher impulsivity/less self-
control in individuals is related to lower scores of mindfulness
(Peters et al., 2011; Bowlin and Baer, 2012; Lee and Chao, 2012;
Wittmann et al., 2014). This is conceptually not surprising since
‘impulsiveness’ can be seen as lying on one end of a concep-
tual continuum with ‘self-control’ and ‘mindfulness’ forming the
other end (Sauer et al., 2011; Wittmann et al., 2014). There are
at least two possibilities as to why the experienced meditators in
Table 2 | Mean group differences between meditators and control subjects in psychophysical tasks.
Mean (SD)
Variable Mindfulness meditators Control subjects TF (df = 82) p
Psychophysical timing tasks
Auditory duration discrimination threshold [ms] 160 (65 ) 165 (82) −0.360 0.720
Visual duration reproduction – short [ms]
600 ms 622 (124) 616 (124) F = 0.262 0.816
800 ms 834 (155 ) 806 (131)
1000 ms 1017 (158 ) 984 (131)
1200 ms 1153 (189) 1124 (167 )
1400 ms 1307 (216 ) 1286 (202)
Visual duration reproduction – long [s]
8 s 7.990 (2.048) 7.771 (1.654) F = 0.593 0.554
14 s 12.369 (2.636) 12.575 (2.311)
20 s 16.617 (3.146 ) 16.690 (2.541)
Auditory duration reproduction – long [s]
8 s 7.442 (1.435) 7.262 (1.670) F = 0.203 0.719
14 s 11.786 (1.827) 11.345 (1.826)
20 s 15.715 (3.268) 15.585 (3.174)
Duration estimation 40 s 66 (32) 67 (32) 0.120 0.905
Duration estimation 80 s 108 (42) 106 (41) −0.217 0.829
Duration production 60 s 54 (21) 61 (21) 1.642 0.104
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our study showed higher impulsivity scores. For one, it is possi-
ble that in the selection process of our study we not only found
individuals who due to their meditation experience are more self-
controlled. We may also have included individuals who as a result
of experiencing more impulsiveness became regular meditators.
That is, they would meditate as a form of psychological “self-
therapy.” Since more impulsive individuals are less accurate in
psychophysical time perception tasks than more self-controlled
subjects (Wittmann and Paulus, 2008; Wittmann et al., 2011), the
fact that our meditators on average were more impulsive may
explain why we did not ﬁnd group differences in the employed
psychophysical tasks, which covered a broad range of methods
and time scales.
However, an unintended side-effect lies in the possibility that
meditators interpreted certain items in the BIS in a conceptually
different way. That is, they would score higher on certain items of
the motor impulsivity subscale due to being more mindful but not
being more impulsive. We came to this conclusion by inspection
of individual items of the BIS. In order to statistically test this idea
we ran separate t-tests for each individual item in the subscale of
motor impulsivity. TheBIS items 4 [t(82)=−3.009; p= 0.003], 17
[t(82) = −3.008; p = 0.003], and 19 [t(82) = −4.438; p = 0.0001]
were signiﬁcantly higher scored by the meditation group than by
the control group. As we will see, there might even be a translation
issue at stake here. The item 4 (“I am happy-go-lucky”; in Ger-
man: “Ich bin unbekümmert”), item 17 (“I act on impulse”; “Ich
bin spontan”), and item 19 (“I act on the spur of the moment”;
“Ich handle aus dem Moment heraus”) in the German trans-
lations may load highly in meditators because they imply that
someone lives within the present moment. This conceptual inter-
pretation is strengthened by the German translation of “I act on
impulse,” which could have been “Ich handle impulsiv,” but was
translated into “Ich bin spontan” which means “I am sponta-
neous.” Thus we conclude that the BIS items are ambiguous in
the sense that a more mindful individual might also be coded
as being more impulsive although he or she is not. The concep-
tual background of meditators thereafter might have led to higher
scores in the BIS that are not necessarily related to actual higher
impulsiveness.
The main results of our study pertaining to time percep-
tion are twofold: (1) long-term meditation practice can slow
down the subjective passage of time as well as prolong the ret-
rospective sense of past intervals; (2) psychophysical performance
of time perception in the milliseconds-to-seconds and minutes
range did not differ between meditators and controls. These two
result clusters are related to two fundamental perspectives in time
perception, namely prospective and retrospective estimates of
duration (Zakay and Block, 1997; Grondin, 2010). In prospec-
tive timing tasks participants have to judge the duration of an
interval in the seconds-to-minutes range they are presently expe-
riencing. Timeperception is thereafter assessed as relation between
subjective estimates of duration and objective clock time. We had
expected to ﬁnd better performance of meditators in the prospec-
tive psychophysical timing tasks for two reasons: (a) practice in
mindfulness meditation has shown to enhance attentional capac-
ities and working memory (Jha et al., 2007; Zeidan et al., 2010;
Moore et al., 2012; Leonard et al., 2013; Malinowski, 2013), these
mental faculties being strongly involved in time perception of
shorter duration (Block and Zakay, 1997; Grondin, 2010); (b)
the perception of time within the present moment is strongly
embodied as it is related to the interoceptive system and to feeling
states of the body (Craig, 2009; Droit-Volet et al., 2013; Wittmann,
2013), mindfulness meditation strengthening body awareness and
increasing the accuracy in discriminating body sensations (Fox
et al., 2012; Mirams et al., 2013).
Related to our discussion of ﬁnding higher values in self-
rated impulsivity in the group of meditators and the potential
reason of having included individuals who might use medita-
tion as a form of psychological self-regulation, we may have
tested a group of meditators that did not outperform the con-
trol subjects. For example, our meditating group did also not
perform differently in the employed computerized attention task
(ANT). This attention task has shown to be sensitive to indi-
vidual performance progress directly after meditation exposure
(Tang et al., 2007) or in an assessment following a mindfulness
training program lasting several weeks but not directly after a
meditation session (Jha et al., 2007). That is, improvements in
performance have so far mainly been detected in meditation
studies with pre- post task differences, for example in studies
probing changes in time perception (Kramer et al., 2013; Droit-
Volet et al., 2015). The lack of differences in the psychophysical
tasks between the two groups is potentially related to large inter-
individual differences in participants. Therefore, investigations
on intra-individual differences before and after meditation prac-
tice (directly after meditation or following mindfulness training
programs) will yield stronger effects than our cross-sectional
approach.
However we found clear-cut group differences in the retrospec-
tive subjective experience of time. ‘Retrospective judgments’mean
that subjective duration is not presently experienced – as is the case
in the prospective psychophysical task – but is reconstructed from
long-term memory. That is, retrospective duration depends on the
amount of experienced contextual changes stored in memory. The
more experienced changes have been stored, the longer an interval
is judged to have lasted (Block and Zakay, 1997; Flaherty et al.,
2005; Wittmann and Lehnhoff, 2005; Bailey and Areni, 2006). In
retrospective judgments of time, longer intervals can be judged
such as the last week, month, year and the last 10 years. Related,
the question of “how fast does time usually pass for you” and the
anticipated intervals of the next week, month, year and the next
10 years are based on retrospective experiences of past time inter-
vals (Yi et al., 2009). The explanation of why retrospective time
intervals in experienced meditators are subjectively prolonged is
the following: since individuals trained in mindfulness meditation
aremore strongly aware of sensory events, their retrospective judg-
ment of past intervals will likely lead to the impression of longer
duration and a slowing down of subjective time (Wittmann and
Schmidt, 2014). Mindfulness meditation is the enhanced aware-
ness of the present moment as an embodied self. But also in
ever-day life a practitioner focuses on her/his experiences more
strongly (Kabat-Zinn, 2005). The ability of mindful persons in an
every-day context to focus more strongly on sensory experiences
and to be more strongly aware of feelings and of body states –
essentially being aware of what is happening right now – causes
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more experiences to be stored in episodic memory which in turn
leads to a relative expansion of retrospective duration (Block and
Zakay, 1997; Avni-Babad and Ritov, 2003; Flaherty et al., 2005).
That is, an increased focus on the feeling self and on the per-
ceived environment at the present moment generally slows down
the subjective passage of time in individuals who practice mind-
fulness. This is assessed with the question of “How fast does time
usually pass for you?” and the questions concerning ‘time pres-
sure’ and ‘time dilation’ where meditators consistently reported a
slower passage of time. But also in retrospect, as a consequence
of an increased awareness in the ‘here and now,’ which leads to
more contextual changes in memory, and related to the questions
of how long the last week and the last month lasted, meditators
report a slower passage of time. Naturally, this explanation is only
theoretical since in our study we did not investigate whether med-
itators actually had enriched episodic long-term memory or better
retrieval mechanisms. It has though been shown that mindfulness
meditation practice actually improves retrieval of positive emo-
tions from memory (Roberts-Wolfe et al., 2012). Moreover, one
could argue that having an increased focus in the present moment
should also lead to better timing abilities in psychophysical tasks,
a capacity which we did not ﬁnd. Having all the discussed limita-
tions of this cross-sectional study in mind, the reported ﬁndings at
least suggest an association between expertise inmindfulnessmed-
itation and the subjective experience of the passage of time and
of past duration. We can at least conclude that we captured med-
itators’ subjective experiences of time slowing down in everyday
life.
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